November/December 1997

Electronic Funds Transfer:
Revolution or Redlining?

By Jerry Reynolds

For the millions of low-income "unbanked" people, EFT may unlock the doors to financial services. But it may also mean windfall profits for banks and a new form of financial redlining.


Beginning in earnest on January 1, 1999, federal benefit payments will be in the form of electronic transaction, and only after that as cash if, that is, you have a bank account and can find an ATM, point-of-sale terminal, bank lobby, or other venue capable of electronic funds transfer (EFT).

For millions of people, the EFT law (officially Section 31001(X) of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996) threatens a revolution in financial services that could evolve into the institutionalized electronic redlining of an economic caste system. Waivers from the central feature of EFT, replacing paper checks to individual addresses with electronic deposits to institutional accounts, will be easy to come by early on at least. Not overnight but increasingly, however, paper checks and "unbanked" status – individuals without accounts – will be attributes of a second-class citizenry.

Preparations for the EFT revolution  are advancing in many quarters. Transitioning Social Security, various agency benefits, payroll, vendor disbursements – everything except tax returns – to electronic conveyance sounds like a typical, inherently unachievable government fire drill. But unlike many other intended technological feats of the federal government, this mandate is taken seriously. That's because the savings figures alone would galvanize even the most ground-down bureaucracy. Approximately 980 million payments are issued annually by the U.S. Treasury Department and other federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense, at a cost of 43¢ per paper check but only 2¢ per electronic transfer. Estimated annual savings to the government and taxpayer range from $100 million to $500 million. Electronic transfers are also more secure because handling and processing are minimized.

Properly implemented, EFT and its companion, Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT), involving public assistance payments, could reduce or eliminate social stigma as a byproduct of, say, food stamps and welfare checks. For anyone with experience holding a bank account, EFT accounts promise to be no more complicated than the federal government's current Direct Deposit program. For the estimated 10 million people who receive federal payments of one kind or another yet maintain no bank account, EFT is perhaps a toehold on the future of mainstream financial services. Among isolated inner-city and rural populations whose banking relationships must take place outside their neighborhoods and communities, EFT can perhaps provide a key to community reinvestment.

From the Needy to the Greedy

"Perhaps" is the operative word in both of these optimistic scenarios. Although both could come to pass, EFT could preordain nothing good for disinvested communities. Like other impending government reforms, the momentum of this transformation will be away from the more needy if it doesn't come with education. The gold rush of the "cyber-49ers," banks and their potential partners, to pan up a profit from the swift-moving EFT current suggests that if anything is preordained, it's more apt to be the following scenarios:

The Treasury Department, which is charged with implementing EFT policy through its Financial Management Services division, is putting together a "default account" for unbanked federal benefit recipients. Treasury intends to describe  this electronic transfer account (ETA) in a request for proposals on which banks will have the chance to bid. Once contracts are awarded, Treasury will begin to assign ETAs through which benefit recipients who have not designated an account can receive their benefits.

Mixed Signals from Treasury

So far, signs are that Treasury is getting the outline right, though the fill-in detail ranges from uncertain to disturbing (a recent sampling to determine what the typical default account should look like excluded non-English speakers and the unbanked at the first segmentation, a stark reversal of the triage most community groups would consider proper). The goal as indicated by various officials is to come up with account attributes that will both appeal to unbanked individuals and maximize bank competition for this new market segment. Among the attributes to which various Treasury officials have publicly committed are some number of free initial withdrawals, low subsequent-use fees, minimal service charges, debit cards permitting the electronic transfer of funds from bank to merchant, and possibly such pricier features as third-party payment capacity and mixing of other funds in the ETA (these options hike the price of doing business by admitting more paper to the process).

Treasury officials also insist that transfers will go only to regulated, insured, depository financial institutions. The weak point in Treasury's approach is that it cannot legally police how people use their money once it is transferred to the recipient's EFT account. As many civil rights and community reinvestment advocates have noted, electronic transfer capabilities between recipient banks and downstream unregulated partners, especially currency exchangers ("check cashers" in a pre-EFT environment), open the door to higher poverty surcharges. Currency exchangers that partner with a bank may add a second layer of "fee for service" charges, or they may find ways to pressure the EFT account-holder into parting with money unnecessarily, for instance, by selling money orders that are cashed on the spot. In any event, they will not have the fiduciary responsibility toward EFT beneficiaries to which banks can be held accountable.

One solution is for Treasury to come up with account attributes that are widely preferred in the public eye to any other way of doing EFT business, according to Margot Saunders of the National Consumer Law Center in Washington. Banks that bid on Treasury's "default accounts" and obtain a contract would then be assured of the volume needed for EFT profitability, while banks seeking EFT accounts would be forced to compete by coming up with still more attractive account attributes.

The following examples illustrate additional strategies that advocacy and other groups are developing to make the EFT revolution serve the unbanked and low- to moderate-income communities.

If EFT establishes a public profile as a valuable service available to everyone, twisting its beneficial potential to narrow political ends or the financial industry's vested profit motives will become that much more difficult. But if a half-hearted education campaign leads to lukewarm public acceptance and an entrenched low profile for EFT issues, the future promises to revisit the past, and the poor will pay again.

Copyright 1997


Jerry Reynolds is the Director of Information Services for First Nations Development Institute in Fredericksburg, VA, and Chairman of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition Subcommittee on Electronic Funds Transfer. For information on rural and reservation-based issues, contact  First Nations, 540-371-5615. For other EFT-related information, contact Josh Silver, National Community Reinvestment Coalition; 202-628-8866

(For some items on how EFT worked out, see the shorts sections of issue #100 and #110)



 
Back to November/December 1997 index.